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The organizational and geographical boundaries of the firm. 





Purpose - The paper aims: to analyse the organizational and geographical (by nation-states) boundaries of the firm and their impact on labour; and to develop a theoretical framework in which firms’ boundaries are analysed from the point of view of labour as a main stakeholder in the firm.

Design/methodology/approach – The paper considers the boundaries in terms of: perspectives (legal/proprietary; responsibility; and control); stakeholders (shareholders and managers as well as labour, governments and suppliers); and dimensions (organization of production; geographical/by nation-state; sectoral). The paper analyses various organizational forms of production in terms of:  control (over labour process and brand); responsibility for labour employed across the value chain; and labour bargaining power. The firm is seen in the context of labour as main stakeholder and of strategic control versus the property rights view of the firm. The paper contains references to some real life cases which support the arguments developed at the theoretical level. 

Findings – In terms of organizational boundaries the paper analyses hybrid forms of firm organization and their implications for the position of labour. In the context of geographical boundaries, conclusions are drawn on the impact of TNCs’ direct activities on labour. Changes in organizational and geographical boundaries are seen as strategic moves that lead to the fragmentation of labour and to the weakening of its bargaining position. There is an analysis of the  role of nation-state regulatory regimes in creating opportunities for TNCs’ advantages towards labour. The basic pillars of this theoretical approach are: (a) emphasis on labour as a main stakeholder as well as one of the main actors towards whom firms develop strategies and who, in turn, develops countervailing strategies; and (b) the assignation of responsibility for labour over that part of the value chain – which could be the whole of it – over which the firm exercises strategic control.

Research limitations/implication – More case study work would further support the arguments in the paper and lead to refinements of the theory.

Social implication – For labour: develop cross-country strategies and argue that the principal firm should take responsibility for the labour force on the basis of the ‘control’ perspective rather than the ‘legal/proprietary’ one. At the macro level we could argue for policies that lead to more homogeneous regulatory regimes across countries and in particular within the EU. There are implications for the strategies of Trade Unions within and across countries. There is also a call for overcoming academic disciplinary boundaries in research specifically those between economics, business strategy and sociology of labour and industrial relations.

Originality/value – The work puts labour at the forefront of analysis in the boundaries of the firm. It develops a theoretical framework for this analysis and for its policy implications including policies by Trade Unions.
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The firm has been the subject of study by economists, sociologists, management scientists, finance and accountancy experts for a long time. A variety of issues are dealt with in the literature. Their richness makes it difficult to arrive at neat classifications and discipline boundaries. A recent volume by Dietrich and Krafft (2012) tries to allocate the issues between ‘Economics of the firm’ and ‘Theory of the Firm’. The former is supposed to be concerned with issues related to organizational boundaries and the internal structure of the firm. The latter is more concerned with issues of firms’ strategies in the context of the market. That the two aspects interact is recognized by the authors in their introductory chapter; indeed, their book aims to build bridges and highlight interactions between the ‘Economics’ and the ‘Theory’ of the firm.

The present author considers the interaction to be so strong as to make it impossible to distinguish between so called ‘Economics’ and ‘Theory’ of the firm. Of course researchers may concentrate on specifics issue but, in the real world, a change, say, in the internal organizational structure of a large firm may impact – and be affected by – its strategic behaviour towards other stakeholders or by changes in the market. Though the issue of boundaries affects both large and smaller firms, we shall concentrate on large and transnational corporations. Smaller firms will come into the discourse mainly in terms of their contractual relationships with the larger corporation.

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses a variety of perspectives, stakeholders and dimensions of boundaries. This is followed by an analysis of boundaries in terms of the organization of production. The fourth section considers cross-countries boundaries and the transnational corporation (TNC). This is followed by two sections in which the boundaries of the firm are considered from the perspective of labour as stakeholder. The last section summarises and concludes.

Boundaries: perspectives, stakeholders and dimensions 

Where does the firm begin and where does it end? Is a small contractor working exclusively for a large department store part of the same retailing firm or a separate firm and if so why? Is a Japanese subcontractor working in the 1980s exclusively for a car manufacturer part of the latter corporation or not? If not, why not?  Are the boundaries of the firm a legal matter as in the property rights approach? Or are they an organizational matter: hierarchies versus markets and their respective efficiency? Or are they connected with control? But what is the meaning of control and why does it matter? Are there several dimensions to boundaries? 

If we want to understand the relevance of boundaries and their impact on various stakeholders to the firm, we must attempt to answer these questions. To facilitate our task, we shall begin with an analysis of perspectives, dimensions and stakeholders of boundaries as summarized in Table 1. The table consists of three vertical sections to be read separately (1a; 1b; and 1c). 

A variety of perspectives

We can consider boundaries from a variety of perspectives and specifically the following. We can take the legal/proprietary perspective and this is mostly what is done in the literature: the activity is part of the firm if the resources invested in it and the outcome/product belongs to the firm. From this perspective when part of the production process is outsourced the process itself and its inputs do not belong to the outsourcing firm and do not form part of it; therefore the principal firm has no responsibility for them. However, the product belongs, contractually, to the principal; it therefore becomes part of the outsourcing firm and can be sold to clients or used for further processing. 

A second perspective relates to control.  Control has several connotations. We can look at control from the perspective of the equity ownership necessary to exercise control at Board level. What percentage of shares is necessary to secure control of the firm vis-a’-vis other shareholders? Hymer (1960) analysed this question in relation to the international firm and came out with the breakthrough distinction between portfolio investment and direct foreign investment. International portfolio investment is investment undertaken for purely financial reasons often on a short-term basis. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is investment large enough to give a controlling and long-term interest in the company​[1]​. 

A second connotation of control relates to the relationship between shareholders and managers. Following Berle and Means (1932) seminal work a large amount of literature has focused on the control exercised by managers who are the real decision-makers within the modern corporation. Their interests do not always coincide with those of the shareholders​[2]​. Moreover, the interest of divisional managers may clash with those of headquarters’ managers. 

Table 1. Boundaries of the firm: perspectives (1a); stakeholders (1b); dimensions (1c).

Perspectives (1a)		Stakeholders (1b)		Dimensions (1c)
Legal/proprietaryControl:Within the firm: Equity ManagerialOutside the proprietary boundariesResponsibility for:Labour forceBrand reputationRisk taking		Shareholders, managersLabourGovernments; tax payers:of regions of nation-statesSuppliers and distributorsConsumersRival firms		Organisation of production: hierarchical externalization hybrid formsGeographical:uninationaltransnationalSectoral field:Single sectorDiversifiedGrowth strategies and processes:Organic growthMergers and acquisitionsOrigin of profits and value:Main activitiesSpeculative investment

Hymer (1971) looked at it from a different angle than the dichotomy managers v shareholders. He considers the necessary technical and organizational structures for the effective exercise of control by managers. In particular, he highlights how, in the modern multidivisional, geographically-spread corporation, the exercise of control over far away subsidiaries may be impossible if the system of communications and the organization of the business across countries are not suitable. This was indeed the case of much foreign business prior to the First World War (WWI). There were then a large number of enterprises whose assets were owned wholly or in large part by a person or groups or companies in foreign countries (often in Britain or The Netherlands). However, though these owners from foreign countries had controlling stakes in the business, they were not in a position to exercise managerial control because of the large distance between the home and host countries under conditions of poor communication and transportation systems​[3]​. 

The following decades saw the development of two relevant and interconnected innovations both of which form the sufficient conditions for the exercise of managerial control. First, the technological innovation in personal communications which started with the telegraph and telephone and, more recently, with electronic communications. Second, organizational innovations​[4]​ which were made possible (and/or strongly facilitated) by the communication technologies.

A further connotation of control relates to control that the large firm can exercise outside its proprietary boundaries on other firms usually smaller ones such as sub-contractors, franchisers and general suppliers or distributors. If the principal firm controls the design, brand, quantity and quality of the process and its output then – strategically – the activity of the subcontractor can be seen as part of the principal firm: they are part of the overall strategy of the larger company and these strategies shape their own business fortunes and actions. In this vein, Cowling and Sugden (1987:12) define the firm within the perspective of strategic control: ‘A firm is the means of coordinating production from one center of strategic decision-making.’ They then go on to extend their definition to the TNC: ‘ A transnational is the means of coordinating production from one center of strategic decision-making when this coordination takes a firm across national boundaries.’

A final perspective on the firm’s boundaries relates to spheres of responsibility and risk taking. This is another side of the strategic control coin, in the relationship between the large principal firm and its network of suppliers. The outsourcing of some or most of the production process usually involves passing on responsibility for the workforce used in that part of the process to the subcontractors. In many cases the latter provide also the equipment and assets necessary in the process. They bear the responsibility and risks for them. An extreme example is that of Uber, the Californian digital taxi company which – so far – appear to own no taxis and to employ no taxi drivers. It supplies the technology.

A variety of stakeholders

The boundaries of the firm have, usually, been analysed from the point of view of shareholders and managers as the main stakeholders. This is in accordance with the legal/proprietary perspective on the firm. There is a huge literature on the shareholders versus managers’ perspective particularly on the possible divergence of interests between these two groups of stakeholders as mentioned in the previous sub-section. I am not going to delve further into this issue as the interest of the present paper is more on those stakeholders that seem to have been rather overlooked by the literature. There are, in fact, several groups of people and institutions which are greatly affected by the boundaries of the firm over and above the shareholders and managers. They are: labour; governments of regions and nation-states; suppliers and distributors (Table 1b).

As the companies’ strategies have become more complex, the impact on these rather forgotten stakeholders has become more profound and yet more opaque. It is, for example, not easy to understand whether and how the loss of bargaining power by labour or governments vis-à-vis the corporate sector in the last three decades may be due to externalization of activities or to strategies of transnationality or to sectoral diversification or to the financialization of the firm (Gallino, 2005).

Many of the problems derive from the fact that researchers analysing firm’s boundaries have tended to use theoretical frameworks with a specific point of view only: that of shareholders and managers. In the following sections I will emphasize how: (a) the strategies of firms are often directed at stakeholders other than consumers and rival firms; and (b) any of these stakeholders can be greatly affected by the firm’s strategies even if the latter are not directly aimed at them. 

A variety of dimensions

The issues discussed in this section are highlighted in Table 1c. Most literature dealing with boundaries takes the view that the boundaries of the firm are an important issue and has to do with the organization/coordination of production and wider business activities and, generally, with governance structures. Traditionally two main governance and coordination structures were seen as relevant: hierarchical coordination via the firm and coordination via the market. The former is also seen as a form of internal organization/coordination and the latter as a form of externalization. In this perspective, the various business activities and stages of the production process can all be organized internally to the firm and run via managerial and hierarchical structures; or some of them can be bought out and thus organized via the market. Casson and Wadeson (2012: 172) write on this: ‘Internalization is a theory of the boundaries of a firm. It does not claim to be a complete and self-sufficient theory of the firm, but rather a necessary component of any comprehensive theory of the firm.’ Whether the managerial/hierarchical or the market coordination prevails depends on specific costs and constraints of operating in the market versus operating internally to the firm. This is the basis of the internalization theory of the firm built up from the seminal work of Coase (1937) on which more in the next section. The further work, in a similar direction, by Williamson (1975; 1981) is seen by some authors as different enough to constitute a different theory and approach. His additional contributions include the emphasis on: bounded rationality and, generally, imperfect information; opportunistic behaviour by parties involved in a transaction; and assets specificity which relates to the fit between internal assets of the firm and its workforce​[5]​. I acknowledge that internalization versus externalization/market coordination is an essential dimension of the debate on boundaries. For this reason it is further considered in details in the next section. Nonetheless, there are other dimensions in the discourse on boundaries. 

A second very important dimension relates to the geography of operations. Within a fully internalized structure – or within the context of those activities and processes that are internalized - the production process may be organized in single or multi-plant or multi branch structures. In the latter case the various plants or branches tend to be spread geographically. The geographical spread may span a single country or several. When more than one country is involved the firm becomes a transnational on which more later. It should, however, be noted that transnationality can occur also within the externalization form of coordination. For example, a TNC from country A can subcontract work or give franchises in countries B, C and D.

Another dimension of boundaries pertains to the sectoral field: many firms operate their activities within a single sector such as mechanical engineering; others may be more diversified and span their activities within more than one sector. The diversification may grow organically – for example a firm producing dishwashers may branch out into the chemical sector by producing washing powder. Or the diversification may relate to completely unrelated sectors or to sectors connected by the potential capture of customers. The latter may be the case of supermarkets selling financial products. Whichever the motivations and strategies leading to diversification, the spreading of firm’s boundaries to sectors other than the original or primary one has implications for the long term life of the firm as well as for its various stakeholders. 

A further dimension relates to growth strategies: organic growth versus growth via mergers and acquisitions (M&As). These two very different growth strategies lead to changes in the boundaries of the firm that have wide implications for the destiny of the company and for its stakeholders, in particular for labour. Finally, we could look at dimensionality in terms of where the profits and values come from. Some firms derive all or most of their profits and value from investment in activities related to their sector(s) of operations. Others may derive a large part of their value and profit from speculative operations i.e. from operations in which they only have a short term speculative interest rather than a long term interest. The latter strategy has long term implications for the firm and thus for its stakeholders.

There are many differences generated by these various dimensions. There are also some commonalities and, in particular, the following. (1) The boundaries of the various dimensions are the results of strategic behaviour by the firm. (2) Conversely, once these strategies are implemented and the boundaries are redrawn – by whatever dimension -, future strategies are affected by them. Moreover, (3) the new boundaries affect the position of different stakeholders: from the owners/shareholders to the managers, to the workforce, to the State to suppliers, to customers to rival firms. In fact, the dimensionality issue acquires particular relevance in the context of an analysis based on a variety of stakeholders such as labour, governments and suppliers because they may be particularly affected by the various dimensional strategies; moreover they, in turn, are likely to react strategically. When one or two stakeholders only are considered - shareholders and managers as in much literature on companies - the dimensionality issue is relatively less relevant.

In the next two sections we shall concentrate on discussions about the two most relevant dimensions of boundaries: (a) internalization v externalization v hybrid forms; and (b) the transnationality dimension. Before we embark on these discussions we should, however, consider the motivations behind the drawing and changing of boundaries whatever their dimension. The traditional, orthodox theory of the firm assumes that the motivation behind the firm is profit maximization. If the market conditions in which our firm operates are competitive and the firm has little or no control over the price of its products, then this means, in effect, efficiency-driven cost minimization. In the real world the situation is complicated by the existence of imperfections in the markets for our firm’s final outputs and/or its inputs. Moreover, the horizon over which profits are to be maximized is not clear-cut leading to unclear outcomes as regards the firm’s behaviour. Behaviour that may lead to losses in the next year, may lead to profits if the horizon is five years and vice versa.   

A different approach is to take the view that, in the context of market imperfection and uncertainty the firm and its managers act strategically rather than – or not just under the motivation of - search for efficiency. Strategic behaviour is considered as part and parcel of firms’ behaviour within business schools. It is also taken into account by economists operating under the assumption of oligopolistic structure, i.e. a market structure in which supply is dominated by few large firms. The strategies given most attention to are usually the ones towards rival firms. What is given less attention is the strategic behaviour towards other players in the economic system: from labour to governments to suppliers. They are stakeholders in the destiny and thus in the strategies of the firm. This paper focuses, in particular on labour​[6]​.

Boundaries and the organization of production

As mentioned above externalization versus internalization is seen by many authors as being the issue on boundaries of the firm. Though not seen as the only dimension of boundaries (Table 1c), it is here considered as a most relevant one for the firm and its various stakeholders. There is now a vast literature on internalization v externalization. Most of it goes back to Coase (1937) seminal work. Why do firm internalize rather than acquire through the market? Indeed were the markets to be as perfect as neoclassical theory has given them credit for, there should be no firms: all business activities would be carried out through market transactions. The answer to why business activities tend to be internalized and why, indeed, firms exist was found in the existence of transaction costs for market operations: costs that are low and negligible when operating internally to a firm/institution. 

This view pits hierarchy versus market as two extreme forms of business governance. However, there have always been intermediate forms such as the put-out system of production; cooperatives organizing business and firms linking with other firms in a variety of ways​[7]​. These intermediate forms of organization of production have been mushrooming since the 1980s both in terms of typology of forms and in terms of number and values of activities they are responsible for. De Man (2004: 159) writes on this: ‘ Just as the divisional form was the organization form of the industrial economy, networks are the organization form of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’ economy.’ The mushrooming has also – predictably – extended to the literature on such hybrid forms (Jolink and Niesten, 2012). Economists, sociologists and business strategists have all contributed and continue to do so. 

A major early contribution is due to Oliver Williamson (1979) who considers ‘intermediate forms of organization’ (p. 234). He identifies the overall objective in choosing between different organizations of business transactions when he writes: ‘The criterion for organizing commercial transactions is assumed to be the strictly instrumental one of cost economizing. Essentially this takes two parts: economizing on production expense and economizing on transaction costs. …the object is to economize on the sum of production and transaction costs.’ (p. 245; italics in original). The aim of his study is to identify the critical dimension with respect to which transactions differ. He identifies the principal dimensions as: ‘uncertainty, frequency of exchange, and the degree to which investments are transaction-specific…’ (p. 261).    

Grandori and Soda (1995) give us the term of ‘inter-firm networks’ for these hybrid forms. ‘An inter-firm network is a mode of regulating interdependence between forms which is different from the aggregation of these units within a single firm and from coordination through market signals…’ (p. 184-5). They highlight how different studies have concentrated on a variety of elements and variables observed in the networks: from the differentiation of the units to be coordinated to the complementarity of their resources; to the intensity of inter-firm interdependence; to the number of units to be coordinated; to the complexity of interdependent activities; to the asymmetry of resources controlled by the various firms in the networks. The latter issue – symmetry v asymmetry – is a particularly relevant one. It ranges from fully symmetric relationships such as cooperatives or trade associations or industrial districts to asymmetric ones: putting-out system; licensing and franchising contracts or subcontracting in which there is a principal and one or more sub-contractors with well defined and differing degrees of control over resources and over contracts. Many of these contracts do not usually involve investment by the principal. In other network forms, assets are invested by the parties such as in: joint ventures or capital ventures.

The excellent survey and analysis by Menard (2004) starts with a review of the large terminology used in relation to hybrid forms​[8]​ of business organizations. They include: ‘… clusters, networks, symbiotic arrangements, supply-chain systems, administered channels, nonstandard contracts,…’ ( p. 347)​[9]​. Menard reviews the ‘more extensively documented forms’ of business organization. They include the following. (a) Subcontracting. This type of relationship is particularly common in the building industry as documented by Eccles (1981). The contractual relationship may be of long duration though each individual contract may have a short duration. (b) Networks of firms linked in supply or distribution chains; (c) Franchising with asymmetrical relationship between principal and franchisee; (d) Collective trademarks; (e) Partnerships; (f) Cooperatives; and (g) Alliances.

What is the position of different participant firms in the network? De Man (2004: ch 3, 39-56) considers three position for firms in a network; as: (a) group member; (b) bridge; and (c) orchestrator of the network. Position (a) leads to symmetry of power and control for all members. These include most cases of collective trademarks and cooperative as well as many partnerships. A firm may be a ‘bridge’ linking several networks with the firms in each network having no contacts or interests in those belonging to a different network. The position of the bridge is, again, asymmetrical with respect to other firms. The orchestrator firm is the one that finds itself in the position of most power with respect to other firms in the network. ‘An orchestrator is a central player in the network, for example because of its market power (Microsoft), brand name (Nike) or position in the supply chain (Toyota).’ (p. 44). Because of these reasons and also because the amount of assets invested in the network may differ, the power position of different firms within the network may not be symmetrical. This echoes our remarks in the second section, first subsection, regarding strategic control by large firms of their suppliers/distributors.

Menard concludes his analysis by stating that: ‘…hybrid organizations represent a challenge to competition policies built on the simplistic trade-off between firms and markets.’ (p. 370; italics in original). I would like to add that they represent also a challenge for: (a) the theory of the firm; and (b) the strategies of labour and trade unions.   

Cross-countries boundaries: the transnational corporation

The boundaries of the firm can also be identified in terms of geography of direct operations (Table 1c). Firms can have all their production activities within the same location or they may disperse them. The dispersion may involve a single country or more than one. The dispersion can be horizontal or vertical. In the latter case the dispersion of activities pertains to different stages of the production process and of the value chain. When direct production activities involve two or more countries we have the transnational corporation. 

As the organizational boundaries needed explanation so do the geographical – by nation state – boundaries. Why do firms invest abroad? The answer is not so straightforward since firms could, after all, produce at home and source foreign markets via exports. This is something they always did and still do to a large extent. So why invest and produce directly abroad? Steven Herbert Hymer a Canadian researcher working at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was the first to delve into the question (Hymer, 1960). Many researchers since have dealt with the same or similar problems and several theories have been developed. They do not all deal with the same issues and type of activity. Some are theory of the TNC as a firm; some deal with the whole range of its activities. Some deal with both the firm and its activities​[10]​.

The study of TNCs and international production takes the point of view of the company as a whole, with the shareholders and possibly the managers as sole stakeholders. The traditional approach is based on the assumption that there is liability of foreignness (LoF) (Hymer, 1960; Zaheer, 1995; Forsgren, 2008​[11]​), i.e. that producing abroad is more disadvantageous and costly compared with producing in domestic locations, and that we must therefore look for compensating advantages in explaining international production. In the 1960s, at the time the pioneer analyses by Hymer and others were developed, it was very reasonable to emphasize the disadvantages of producing in foreign countries. But is it now? Currently we have a situation in which​[12]​: (i) International production has been increasing at a very fast pace; it is involving more and more countries as well as an increasing number of companies. (ii) Large TNCs are spreading their geographical networks of activities wider and wider. (iii) Moreover, the direct international involvement of smaller companies is now considerable and growing. It should, however, be noted that the LoF varies with the experience of a company and indeed of a country involvement in a specific host country​[13]​.

Nation-states generate advantages for TNCs

The nation-state can be a very significant player in the establishment of firms’ advantages in the transnational context.  This can come about via deliberate policies but also because of the specificity of countries in terms of regulatory regimes. By regulatory regime I mean the sets of all laws, regulations and customs governing the economic, social and political life of a country. They therefore include the sets of institutions and regulations governing production, markets and the movement of resources across countries. Each country has a specific regulatory regime and thus a specific set of rules and regulations which often have historical origin as well as institutional connotations. Countries differ – sometimes substantially – in terms of their specific regulatory regime. However, the regulatory regime tends to be more homogeneous and consistent within each nation-state. 

Here the nation-state is, therefore, seen as the locus of a set of regulatory regimes, that is, of a set of specific, rules and regulations which apply to people, firms and institutions within the borders of the nation-state. Some of these rules and regulations stem from the legal or institutional system, some from government policies. Most of the following elements of regulatory regimes embrace several or all aspects of both institutional and policy frameworks.

Elements of nation-states’ regulatory regimes
	Rules and regulations regarding the social security system and in particular different regimes regarding labour and its organisation
	Fiscal regimes
	Currency regimes
	Regimes of industrial policy
	Rules and regulations regarding environmental and safety standards

Business across national frontiers may involve additional costs compared to business within the boundaries of the nation-state.  The costs are associated mainly with spatial and cultural distances​[14]​. Differences in regulatory regimes may also involve extra costs because, for the TNCs, the mastering of – and managing in the context of – different laws, regulations and customs by their managers, may also be costly. 

However, different regulatory regimes can also be the source of considerable advantages for firms operating transnationally. The advantages of transnationality can be with reference to the following stakeholders: labour; governments; suppliers/distributors; and rival firms​[15]​. The existence of differences in regulatory regimes across nation-states allows companies that can truly plan, organize and control across frontiers to develop strategies to take advantage of such differences. This is particularly the case when the strategies aim to enhance power vis-à-vis actors who cannot - or not yet - plan and organize across national frontiers, or not to the same extent as TNCs. 

Labour as stakeholder in the boundaries of the firm

Let us now go back to Table 1 section b: different stakeholders in the boundaries of the firm. The most striking feature in reading works on the organization of business transactions – be they by hierarchical structures or coordinated via the market or via hybrid forms – is the fact that the perspective is always the efficiency and effectiveness of the individual firm in relation to the interests of shareholders and managers. De Man (2004) sees the advantages for firms and the wider economy in terms of more productive use of resources linked to specialization between the various partners in the network. The point of view of other stakeholders such as labour and governments hardly comes in. Labour in particular, seems to be the forgotten stakeholder in these studies​[16]​. Yet the position of labour is greatly affected by the various dimensions and particularly by the organizational and the geographical (by nation-states) dimensions discussed in the previous two sections. Moreover, labour and its bargaining power may be key in the development of firms’ strategies leading to various dimensions.

To illustrate this point let us first delve into the question of how we got where we are in terms of prevailing governance structures and geography of direct activities. Coase started his analysis of governance structures by noting that the firm and internalization appear to be the odd one out in need of explanation. In fact, internalization and the growth of firms via internal activities was also the premise of Chandler (1962) work. This can be explained by the growing concentration of production and increasing firm size alongside an economic theory that saw the market as sovereign and competition as the normal and desirable market structure. There was a need for a theory that kept the basic premises of the neo-classical approach while trying to explain why firms grew bigger and, therefore, why the market was not perfect.  Coase’s theory provided the explanation. 

In the first decades after WWII the firm grew internally under the pull of growing economies and of favourable macro economic conditions with increasing demand for exports and consumption as well as investment. There was also plenty of labour supply due to more women entering the labour force and to the favourable immigration policies in developed countries. All these conditions further favoured internal growth of firms, via hierarchical structures. 

The next few decades bring higher demands by the employed labour force. Internalization has made it easier for labour employed under the same ownership umbrella to organize and feel solidarity. The demands of labour grow at a time when investment opportunities start declining and when the 1970s energy crisis adds to the macro problems. In this situation firms start looking for solutions that involve a decrease in the power of labour to organize and resist: externalization is one such solution. As time goes by, technology comes to the aid of such a solution: the information technologies make it easier to exercise control whether the production activities take place internally or externally. Moreover, logistics solutions – pressing under the externalization drive - are eased by the same technology as well as by the diminishing costs of transportation. 

Move forward to the decades from 1980 onwards. Coase’s internalization theory is now well developed and accepted. Yet, the business, economic and social situation has changed. Externalization has taken hold and is spreading rapidly both in private and public sector institutions. If we stick to the logic of the neoclassical theory – now encompassing also Coase’s theory – we have to look for fundamental changes in transaction costs between the decades around and after WWII and the decades from the 1980s onwards. The dichotomy internalization v externalization has always been there: why have we seen the system as a whole move – in time - in two completely different directions – internalization first and later externalization?  The purely neo-classical theory cannot explain it; or, at least, I have not seen convincing explanations of why market transactions costs have changed between the two periods. Why they may have been very high in the decades after Coase’s publication and why they may have been very low – thus leading to more externalization and market transactions - in the last four decades. I should, however, point out that most writers in this tradition rarely indulge in historical comparisons; their analysis tends to be related to static situations at the micro level. If confronted with such historical shifts, their conclusion might be that the shift from internalization to externalization is a sign that transaction costs have changed: in other words assume away what needs explaining. In this writer’s view the shift needs explaining and, indeed, in explaining it, we can through light on wider issues regarding the firm and its stakeholders. 

It is here suggested that the move towards externalization has roots in social and political elements as well as in economic ones. It is also suggested that strategic behaviour on the part of large firms led to externalization and that such strategic behaviour was largely in relation to labour. Faced with increasing bargaining power by labour, companies looked for ways of curtailing such power – in most cases with the assent and support of governments - via strategies of labour fragmentation. Thus the organization of production is here seen as closely related to the role and power of labour. Firms’ strategies are greatly affected by conflicts with labour and developed partly as attempts to solve those conflicts.

	Labour fragmentation strategies 

In the previous two sections we have analysed the changing boundaries of the firm with respect to two dimensions: the organizational dimension (hierarchical v hybrid v market) and the geographical (by nation-state) dimension. Both these dimensions have become more relevant in the last 35 years. Both involve labour in two respects: because the relationship between the firm and labour and their industrial relations record may be one of the determinants of strategies leading to specific boundaries; and because the change in boundaries has considerable effects on the bargaining position of labour. Labour is therefore a significant stakeholders in the boundaries of the firm (Table 1b).

What strategies are open to companies that want to prevent or make it difficult for labour to increase its bargaining power? It will be in the interest of companies to try and implement strategies leading to the fragmentation of labour and, in particular, the following:
	organizational fragmentation through the externalization of some activities within an overall strategy of control of production;
	fragmentation by nation-states through the location of production in various countries characterized by different labour, social security and labour organization regimes.
These two fragmentation strategies are not incompatible and they may indeed be implemented together. The first strategy (organizational fragmentation) involves the company in the externalization of labour through outsourcing strategies (such as subcontracting or franchising arrangements) that allow considerable control of production but without the responsibility for the labour employed for such production. The second strategy involves the spread of production in regions, countries, areas not linked by common labour organization regimes, i.e. having different trade unions and/or different labour and social security laws and regulations. These elements make the organization of labour and its resistance to the demands of capital more difficult. The underlying assumptions in this analysis are the following.
First, that labour organization is easier whenever labour works for the same ‘ownership/management unit’ (the hierarchical form of organization); and, that labour organization is more difficult whenever employment is dispersed among many smaller units – be they wholly or partially independent firms – or among some large and some small units. Externalization involves costs and advantages. The costs are in terms of control over quality of products​[17]​, possible debasement of the brand, possible loss of technological competencies and problems with delivery deadlines. For example, in a detailed case study from the automobile industry, Zirpoli and Becker (2011) conclude that, in the interest of efficiency and long term profitability, companies should not outsource activities that: (a) directly impact on performance; and (b) have a high degree of reciprocal interdependence with those technologies directly linked to performance. The advantages of externalization are in terms of: low responsibility for labour; lower resistance by labour as labour organization is more difficult and often made illegal across different proprietary units; shift of much risk from the principal firm to the smaller subcontractors. The risk relates to both the labour force employed in the value chain and – in many cases – the equipment employed. These issues have been considered in the literatures on industrial relations (Marchington, et al., 2004) and sociology of organizations (MacKenzie, 2008) though less so in the economics and business strategy literatures.
Second, that labour organization is easier within a single country than between different nation-states. This does not imply that, for labour, full harmonization and homogeneity of organization and power exist within each country. Differences can arise at the level of regions due to local conditions and institutional structures, or between different industries or due to different structural features of production in terms of ownership/management arrangements. The main point made here is that, on the whole, there are greater difficulties for the actual and potential labour organization between countries separated by institutional, political, cultural, legal and governmental borders than within each border. We can then define areas of ‘labour organization regimes’ as those geographical areas within which - ceteris paribus - labour finds it easy to organize itself effectively. They are likely to be defined by the geographical boundaries of the nation-state though it is conceivable that they could extend only within smaller regions of the same country or that they could theoretically extend to various nation-states (such as the European Union - EU) if labour manages to organize and mobilize across nation-states. 
The employment and industrial relations literature has a considerable body of work on internationalization issues​[18]​.  Lillie and Martinez Lucio (2012) tackle the difficulties of trade unions organization and mobilization across nation states. They write: '...unlike corporations, unions almost never operate in more than one country, or merge across national boundaries. Most transnational union activity occurs on an informal network basis, as cooperation between independent organization.' (p. 80).  Other issues considered in the literature range from modalities of co-operation between trade unions of different nation states and their political implications (Martinez Lucio, 2010) to the role of digital technologies in developing networks (Pulignano, 2009; Whittall et al. 2009), to the determinants of transnational solidarity (Anner et al. 2006) to opportunities for forging transnational alliances with other social movements be they consumers, intermediaries and political groups (Wills, 2002; Doellgast, 2008) to contingent sectoral situations for the development of international labour markets and opportunities for cross-border union linkages​[19]​. 
	
Firm boundaries: an approach based on labour

So far the discussion on boundaries has placed the firm - as defined in the legal/proprietary perspective - centre stage; the firm as represented by its owners and managers. However, as discussed above (Table 1b), the firm has other stakeholders and particularly labour. One of the major theoretical and policy issues considered in previous sections, is the question of what the boundaries of the firm imply for the boundaries of labour’s interests, strategies and actions. Currently, whenever the organization of production is non-hierarchical, it is widely assumed that the firm has no responsibility for the labour involved in the activities bought/contracted out by the firm from outside its proprietary confines. The widely-used language of internalization versus externalization lends itself to the idea of insider versus outsider labour. Moreover, it is assumed that labour employed by the same transnational companies in different countries is the responsibility of the subsidiary – as employer - in each specific country.

To sow the seeds of a different theoretical approach, let us begin by considering Table 2  which lists a variety of organizational forms of production against a variety of characteristics. Between the two Coasian organizational extreme forms of hierarchy versus market (Table 2, col. 1, rows 2 and 3), there are a variety of other possibilities listed in Col 1 under: franchising; subcontracting; external distribution chains; and alliances. In Table 1a we considered control as one of the perspectives of the firm. In Table 2 (cols 2 and 3) the focus is on control by the principal firm over production and its process as well as over the firm’s brand. Column four considers whether the power relationship between various partners in the contractual form is symmetric or asymmetric. This has implications for the power relationship between large firms and smaller ones in external contracts. Comuns 5 and 6 consider the position of the firm vis-a'-vis labour. Column five highlights whether the principal firm has responsibility for all the labour employed in the value chain. Column six attempts an assessment on the impact of organizational forms on labour’s bargaining power and in relation to the whole labour employed in the value chain. 

Table 2. Organizational forms by specific characteristic and impact on labour







Alliances/JVs	No	Yes	Sym/Asy depending on assets involvement	No	Unclear
*In columns 2-5 the perspective is the principal firm. In col. 6 the perspective is that of labour.
NB. Any of the organizational forms above can be developed at the national or international level. Whenever several countries are involved – in whatever form – the (negative) impact on the bargaining power of labour is likely to increase.

Table 2 is a snapshot at a point in time and it therefore illustrate a static situation. Moreover, it is one that gives the impression of non reactive behaviour on the part of participants: labour, in particular is seen as exhibiting a passive behaviour. In the real world things are more dynamic and interactive with strategic actions on the part of one actor being followed by counteractions by the other actor(s). The situation changes almost continually and strategies may have to be redeveloped from time to time by all parties.  This means also that the real overall picture is more nuanced than shown in the table: there are several intermediate positions between the Yes and No or between the High and Low we see in the cells. Moreover, in relation to actors outside the proprietary confines of the firm, the table considers only firms that are partners in the value chain (Col. 4) and labour (Col. 5 and 6).  In reality there are other players whose actions have effects on the overall picture: from rival firms to suppliers to consumers to governments. Nonetheless, I think that though reality is more nuanced, dynamic and interactive than the cells illustrate, the table is useful in highlighting the firm's organizational forms in relation to issues of control, power and responsibility.

In Table 2 the strategies of the firm with regard to its boundaries allocate to labour, boundaries that are more limited than the firm’s boundaries of strategic control. Specifically, for example, in the case of contracts with suppliers or distributors, the responsibility for labour is within each firm separately, be they principal or contractor: labour’s boundaries of actions and organization are confined within the principal firm and each subcontractor separately. 

Currently, the principal company is able to exercise strategic control across a variety of firms, sectors and countries while having responsibility only for the labour directly employed by it. Yet larger number of workers – in various countries – may be contributing to the product which ultimately belongs to it - the principal firm - and is sold under its brand. The question is: should that be so, given that labour is greatly affected by the changing boundaries of the firm? There has been a tacit assumption that labour organization and power cannot and should not be all encompassing whenever the value chain is fragmented across different legally independent units​[20]​. In many countries this assumption has a basis in law. However, there is also a theoretical economics basis in it: the boundaries of the firm have been seen only from the perspective of the shareholders and managers. Is there a way of thinking in terms of a different viewpoint on the boundaries of the firm? Of a labour’s point of view on boundaries? 

If we take the purely legalistic perspective – in terms of labour law - the firm has no responsibility for labour in these forms and this makes the workforce operating along the value chain very weak in terms of bargaining power (Table 2, col. 6). However, it can be noted that, unlike in the case of arm’s length transactions, the principal firm has a considerable degree of control over production, its process and its brand along the value chain (Table 2, cols 2 and 3). It could therefore, be argued that, on the basis of control, the boundaries of the firm are wider than those of the principal firm and that such wider boundaries should also apply to the boundaries of its responsibility, including responsibility for labour employed throughout the value chain. 

Might we, therefore, begin to think that the boundaries of interest and activity of labour should be extended to include all activities over which the company has strategic control? The case for a positive answer lies in the fact that all strategies regarding boundaries and all dimensions and scope of the firm’s boundaries have serious implications for the position of labour at both micro and macro levels: in terms of employment, wages, conditions as well as social security issues. An alternative view would see the boundaries of interest and activity as encompassing labour working for both the principal firm and the myriad of sub-contractors or franchisees or distributors. The boundaries of labour’s interest, strategies and actions could also be seen to cross over the nation-state and become transnational whenever the company has activities in several countries directly or via its suppliers. The boundaries of labour interest, strategies and action could also be seen to span over more than a single sector, whenever the firm becomes diversified. 

I see these issues from the point of view of an economic theory of the firm that takes account of labour as a stakeholder. However, and as expected, industrial relations experts as well as trade unionists and labour lawyers have also been taking a keen interest in these issues. Doellgast at al. (2015) give four interesting examples of successful union activity and mobilization from the telecommunications industry involving workers in cases of organizational fragmentation. 

Another important example come from across the Atlantic. I refer to the recent protest by fast food workers over wages and conditions on May 15th, 2014. The Observer (2014) reports on the on going dispute between workers employed in franchises and the fast food companies such as McDonald’s. It quotes one low paid franchisee employee as saying: “McDonald’s says it’s not a boss, but it certainly acts like one. Setting rules and controlling just about every aspect of its stores, so that the only thing that franchisees can skimp on is wages…”. The National Labour Relations Board (NLRB)​[21]​ is reported as arguing that ‘the company has too much say not to be counted as a ‘joint employers’” The workers rejected the claim that each franchisee is an independent employer and they all came together to protest independently of the organizational fragmentation. Moreover, the action was coordinated in some 150 cities across the world: thus geography (by nation states) and organizational boundaries were overcome. This seems like the beginning of something with great potential for further development in a variety of industries. 

Similar arguments centred on control are being used by lawyers representing people working for internet platform providers such as the California-based Uber and Lyft. The lawyers have, successfully argued – in the case of Uber – in front of the California Labor Commissioner, that Uber has too much control over the workers using Uber’s platform for the latter not to take full responsibility as employer (The Financial Times, 2015).  Control over pricing, tipping, type of car used and routes chosen is necessary for Uber to ensure - and claim to provide – consistency of performance across drives and routes. Similar legal claims have been filed in the UK (The Guardian, 2015).

These cases illustrate the possibility of success for labour whenever unions network and mobilize     
(a) across production networks encompassing both principal and franchisees/subcontractors/agents; and/or (b) across countries within the same transnational company; or (c) across countries and production networks fragmented by outsourcing. The fast food case relates to (c) while the telecommunications cases relate to (a). The theoretical analysis developed in this section fits in well with this real case in industrial relations. The fast food workers, the telecommunications workers and the Uber taxi drivers are saying to companies and to economics and business studies academics: we have a strong stake in the firms we work for; we do not accept the boundaries set by the legal/proprietary approach to the firm; we see the boundaries as set by the strategic control view.

I have so far put the case for the development of a theory of the boundaries of the firm from the perspective of labour as major stakeholder in its destiny. I have tried to argue that such a case needs a shift of focus in the analysis of the boundaries of the firm from the strictly legal perspective - in terms of ownership of assets and final product - to the issue of strategic control.  There are challenges and opportunities in following such a path. I see two main challenges. The first relates to the difficulties that the academic community would have in such a shift of focus in the way the firm is conceived. The second major challenge is to develop the theory in more details while keeping it on a realist path.

The opportunities are many and have to do with stronger collaboration between different academic and professional fields. As I mentioned above there are, indeed, many studies on the issue of organizational and geographical fragmentation of production from the point of view of labour by sociologists of employment and industrial relations. Labour is at the forefront of these studies. However, most of those I have come across do not delve into the issue of the boundaries of the firm or rather they seem to assume the standard theory about the boundaries being set by the legal framework and in terms of internalization versus externalization. Thus we have a lopsided situation in which studies on labour markets, industrial relations and employment are based on - and take for granted a - theory of the firm that neglects labour not only as a stakeholder but also as a main actor in the firm's strategies. 

Conversely, there are many studies that look at the boundaries of the firm in terms of hierarchies versus markets by economists and business strategies. However, labour tends to be a forgotten stakeholders in these studies though it is widely known and reported regularly in the media that labour plays a key role in the strategic behaviour of firms. Here we have a case of (dare I say it?) Hamlet without the prince.

The approach here suggested is for a theory of the boundaries of the firm that takes full account of labour in its various roles: (a) as stakeholder in the performance and destiny of the firm; (b) as one of the main actors towards whom the managers develop strategies; and (c) as one of the actors that develop countervailing strategies that affect the firm and its further strategic decisions.  Moreover, the approach; (d) stakes a claim for the firm's responsibility over that part of the value chain on which it exercises strategic control. 





The paper starts with an analysis of the firm’s boundaries in terms of a variety of issues highlighted in Table 1 (a, b and c). Perspectives: legal/proprietary; responsibility; control. Stakeholders: shareholders and managers but also others and specifically labour and governments. Dimensions: – organization of production; geographical/by nation-state; sectoral. Specific consideration is given to the organization of production in hierarchical as well as in a variety of so-called hybrid forms and to the position of labour in the context of these forms (second and third sections). The geographical - by nation-states - dimension is given particular relevance leading to a discussion of transnational companies, the advantages they derive from operating across borders and the source of such advantages (fourth section). 

The paper then moves on to a detailed analysis of the position of labour as stakeholder in the changing boundaries of the firm (fifth and sixth sections). Regarding labour both the organizational and geographical dimension of strategies of fragmentation are analysed. The conclusion is that the changing boundaries of the firm particularly with respect to organizational forms and to the geography of direct foreign operation by TNCs does put labour in a weaker position. It is suggested that the case for allocating to the principal firm responsibility for the labour employed in the value chain  - independently of its geographical location or its organizational form of production - rests with the issue of strategic control.  The main argument here is that, whenever a company exercises managerial strategic control over other firms in the value chain, it is appropriate to take the view that the principal firm should also have responsibility for the whole labour along the value chain. In practice this requires a considerable amount of ground work in defining and identifying relevant elements of control and in building up cases. 
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^1	  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) gives a guideline of 10 percent ownership for investment to be included in FDI. For more details on this see Ietto-Gillies (2012: Ch 1). 
^2	  There is a huge literature on this issue. See Baumol (1959), Marris (1967); Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) and, more recently, Bo and Driver (2012).
^3	  Mira Wilkins (1988) calls these businesses ‘free-standing enterprises’ to highlight the fact that, though they were owned wholly or partially by foreign nationals (whether individuals or groups or companies), they were managed and developed as independent concerns.  
^4	  Developments in internal organization of companies have been analysed under several theoretical approaches. From Penrose (1959) to Chandler (1962) to Williamson (1975; 1981; 1984) to Hymer (1970). Westney and Zaheer (2001) consider grid structures. See also Ietto-Gillies (2012: Ch. 1) for a more comprehensive discussion on this issue.
^5	  Both Coase’s and Williamson’s contributions are discussed in Ietto-Gillies (2012: Ch. 8) as part of the analysis of the internalization approach to the theory of the transnational corporation.
^6	 	 The position of governments and of suppliers is considered in Ietto-Gillies (2014).
^7	 	 Casson and Cox (1997) point out that in the 19th century international business networks originating with British businesses were quite common.
^8	 	 It is worth noting that naming these forms as hybrid implies that the norm is either the market or the hierarchy.
^9	 	 Menard quotes Oliver and Ebers (1998: 550) as remarking on the ‘ of heterogeneous concepts, theories and research results’.  
^10	 	  Most theories are presented and commented on in Ietto-Gillies (2012). See also Ietto-Gillies (2007).
^11	 	 See also various articles in the Journal of International Management (2002).
^12	 	 The technological and political conditions that led to a decrease in the LoF are discussed in Ietto-Gillies (1997)
^13	 	 I am grateful to Giovanni Balcet for pointing this out to me.
^14	 	 The ‘spatial’ and ‘cultural’ dimensions are considered in Ietto-Gillies (2012: Ch. 14).
^15	 	 For TNCs there are also advantages independent of specific stakeholders and, in particular, advantages of knowledge acquisition/innovation and of risk spreading. On these see Ietto-Gillies (2012: Ch. 17).
^16	 	 De Man (2004: pp.164-66) does devote one section (The individual in the Network) to a discussion of the need for the workforce to upgrade its knowledge and to be flexible to meet the demands of the firm as well as the network. The point of view here is, again, the firm not the employee.
^17	 	 This is particular relevant in services industries where the quality of the product cannot be inspected prior to acquisition and delivery.
^18	  Two reviewers of this journal have supplied me with key references on the employment and industrial relations literature leading to a redraft of this section. I am grateful for their help.
^19	  See Lillie and Greer (2007) on the construction industry in EU countries.
^20	 	This is, of course, a generalization. There are country specific differences; in some countries, sectoral union structures may encompass the whole or most of the value chain.
^21	 	For the NLRB, its activities and history, see http://www.nlrb.gov 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